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Abstract Hailed as the greatest European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) mission to date, the European Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EU-
LEX) has been oscillating between fulfilling its mission statement crafted 
in Brussels, while managing the controversial ethnic expectations of the 
local population in Kosovo. Because of its imposed “status neutral,” in its 
three years of deployment in Kosovo, EULEX is considered to have been 
preoccupied with keeping a low profile, remaining invisible and not taking 
stances in an otherwise politically unsettled territorial entity amid acute 
ethnic cleavages. While it is considered as an important example to test 
the EU’s vertical and horizontal consistencies, EULEX’s ambiguous legal 
status has had its own implications; how EULEX seeks to maintain its 
coherence within Kosovo with its headquarters in Brussels. With most of 
its work dedicated to its Press and Information Office, in articulating and 
setting forward communication in three different languages and aiming 
three different (to say the least) audiences, its journey is still that of seeking 
legitimacy and popular support. This work examines EULEX from a criti-
cal perspective.
Keywords: EULEX, Kosovo, coherence, EU, the Western Balkans 
Introduction
This work problematises and deconstructs the EU mission in Kosovo 
by focusing on its legal, political and identity-related dimensions. Ini-
tially sought as a mission with a mandate derived from the EU, due to 
internal divisions within the EU in relation to Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence – among Greece, Cyprus, Romania, Slovakia and Spain 
– EULEX ended up being deployed under UN auspices. Since then the 
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mission has had its proverbial hands full attempting to understand its 
legal and political identity while remaining “neutral” regarding Koso-
vo’s independent status. This ambiguity has led to numerous function-
al and operational problems with the mission itself that are hampering 
its legitimacy. 
Numerous studies have focused on EULEX’s controversial person-
ality in Kosovo, its differentiated discourse and its legitimacy among 
the population in Kosovo; two of them, Peters’ article and KCSS report 
are especially relevant to this article. This research however, brings a 
Derridian deconstructionist approach to EULEX’s discourse and em-
bedding it to further ESDP studies. In a more meta-theory level, this 
work sets forward the problematising of EULEX on the poststructur-
alist account of Derrida to eventually conclude with an explanation as 
provided by the Regional Security Complex Theory.
A poststructuralist approach will be undertaken to understand and 
analyse the EU’s rule of law mission in Kosovo, primarily by focusing 
on its official discourse on the pursuit of deconstruction as conceptu-
alised by Derrida. Focus is paid to the politicisation of language used 
in specific EULEX texts such as: press releases, official documents and 
speeches. Additionally, a number of interviews with Kosovo’s elite have 
been conducted in relation to how EULEX is perceived in the field. 
Before deconstructing EULEX’s discourse, it is important to dis-
cuss deconstruction per se, its epistemological facets and above all the 
way it is conceptualised in this work. As many other poststructuralist 
approaches/methods/techniques, deconstruction is among the most 
misunderstood, not only because of its non-deterministic, non-stat-
ic epistemology but also because of the very nature of systematised 
positivist approaches that it is viewed in opposition to. According to 
Cilliers, ‘we no longer have to fight against a cruel positivism but at the 
same time there seems to be a growing resistance against theoretical 
positions which emphasise the interpretative nature of knowledge.’1 As 
a result, most of the academic work following interpretivist methods, 
usually begin with a “defensive” part – explaining how are these ap-
proaches in relation to what the positivists call valid – and objective 
scientific inquiry. 
Deconstruction in General
Because deconstruction is a highly personal and intimate intervention, 
different authors provide different explanations on its epistemological 
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foundation as well as methodological characteristics. Derrida once ex-
plained that although he had been given numerous occasions to define 
deconstruction, he still maintains that 
deconstruction isn’t a theory, a school, methodis, even a dis-
course, still less a technique that can be appropriated – at 
bottom – what happens or causes to pass. It remains then to 
situate, localize, determine what happens with what happens 
when it happens.2 
For Cilliers, deconstruction argues for the irreducibility of meaning; 
meaning and knowledge cannot be fixed in a representational way, 
but they are always contingent in the contextual. The context itself 
isn’t transparent but has to be interpreted instead. In his essay ‘The 
Dialectics of Realist Theory and the Eurocentric Problematic of Mod-
ern Discourse,’ Hostettler explains deconstruction as a disclosure of 
various kinds of contradictions by giving us discourse and discipline 
as historical categories and with Derrida developing the technique of 
writing pointing out the internal contradictions and limits of modern 
discourse.3
Derrida says that to deconstruct is to reverse hierarchy. For me, in 
a broad, yet insufficient explanation, deconstruction seeks to ally with 
the marginal, with the “non-mainstream,” with the absent, with the 
oppressed. It seeks to scrutinise discourse and text to unravel struggles 
of power and the dynamics of dominance. I agree that it is not an ap-
proach/technique/method – it is more of state of mind. Deconstruc-
tion turns upside down our Abrahamic conceptualisation of being, liv-
ing and existing, the phallogocentric discourse and logic of attribution, 
the politicisation of race, gender, sexuality, democracy, Western impe-
rialism and superiority. By claiming that there’s nothing out there, or 
there’s nothing beyond text, it dissolves the static deterministic knowl-
edge – that is unable to see that there is actually “something there.” 
Deconstruction at Work … Understanding EULEX
This work commenced from a meta-theoretical discussion of the epis-
temological paradigm of the mission, and tries to produce a more nar-
rowed analysis of the missions discourse and the particular concepts 
germane to the context. This section deconstructs discourse gathered 
from EULEX’s main documents throughout 2009-2011 (press releas-
es, speeches, official documents). Particular attention has been given 
to the press releases in English and its’ differences in language as text 
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and meaning in comparison to the ones in Albanian and Serbian. Ac-
cording to Peters, strategic communication is crucial for the success 
of civilian and military crisis management operations. He notes that 
‘Domestic publics have to be convinced that the operations are worth 
pursuing, and the publics in the countries where the operations take 
place have to be persuaded to support the missions’ objectives.’4 
In naming Europe, Derrida refers to a ‘new figure of Europe,’ or the 
Europe to come rather than EC5; in a similar fashion he talks about de-
mocracy as the democracy to come – but one which is never there, nev-
er here, never present. This is its essence insofar as it remains: not only 
it will remain ‘indefinitely perfectible, hence always insufficient and 
future, but belonging to the time of the promise […]’6 The installation 
of the EU mission in the Western Balkans in general – and particularly 
with its peculiar forms of post-modernist sovereignty (or the inversion 
of sovereignty as David Chandler calls it7) in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Kosovo – brought a number of democracy promotion institutions, 
rule of law structures and human rights mechanisms as materializa-
tion of the European integration project. For the past 15 years these 
structures have been given forward as the only, indubitably sole project 
for these countries, homogenising this way the choice of discourse and 
action. According to Derrida, ‘as soon as there’s production, there is 
fetishism, idealisation, automatisation, dematerialisation and spectral 
incorporation. Fetishism has the ability that ideas generated by capi-
talist relations turns them into something like religion.’ It is important 
to highlight here that by repeating the democratic standards and rule 
of law project under the EU’s integration pendulum – “European pro-
ject,” without clarifying them as concepts – has led to the fetishising of 
the “European project” for Kosovo. By this logic, deconstruction can, 
among other things, be read as a rethinking of Western philosophy, or 
as a rhetoric of textuality and absence.8 Phiddian reminds that 
Deconstruction becomes a method for discovering the op-
pressed others beneath phallogocentric discourse. It is used 
as hermeneutic of suspicion, as an instrument for unpicking 
the structures and rhetoric of racism, patriarchy, psychological 
repression, class.9
Trying Horizontal Coherence 
Much of the literature concerning the EU’s Common Foreign and Se-
curity Policy (CFSP) suggests that the EU is still struggling with prob-
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lems of consistency, and many scholars remain sceptical about the 
capability of the EU to ever become a coherent actor. For instance, 
Sjursen and Nuttall note that the EU, as a global actor, suffers from 
coherence problems both vertically and horizontally. Problems of ver-
tical coherence may occur when the foreign and security policies of in-
dividual member states do not fit together with policies decided at the 
EU-level. On the other hand, problems of horizontal consistency are 
linked to the EU’s involvement in various external activities that used 
to belong to the various pillars.10 The case of EULEX Kosovo is inter-
esting for attempting to foster horizontal coherence and for trying to 
function amid strong vertical incoherence among some of its member 
states in relation to the mission. In our case however, it is argued that 
more for sticking to the traditional implementations of coherence as 
effectiveness, in the case of EULEX coherence in discourse and man-
date would potentially lead to greater legitimacy for the mission. 
First, this work will see how EULEX, as a European Security and De-
fence Policy (ESDP) mission, seeks to build on the coherence of the 
EU as an external actor in Kosovo with other EU institutions which do 
not necessarily retain similar mandates. The changes brought about 
by the Lisbon Treaty sought to enhance the consistency in action/dis-
course so that the EU can speak with “one voice.” According to Peters, 
the characteristic of EULEX in being the largest civilian mission ever 
launched under the CSDP has provided a chance for the EU to consoli-
date its actorness on the international stage, which influences how EU 
foreign policy is perceived by others.11 This is particularly evidenced in 
the EULEX’s discourse on the so-called ‘technical dialogue’ between 
Pristina and Belgrade; one of the most important diplomatic projects 
of the EU in its policy for the stabilisation of the Western Balkans. 
In contrast, the initiation of the dialogue between Pristina and Bel-
grade has been defined as a technical dialogue where both parts would 
negotiate about technical issues such as regional cooperation, freedom 
of movement and the rule of law. Such negotiations have been prov-
en to be intrinsically political in their nature due to the political and 
contested sovereignty between Kosovo and Serbia. Despite claiming 
its mission to be of a purely technical nature, EULEX signals its readi-
ness to be actively involved in traditional political issues. Additionally, 
EULEX makes frequent statements on the visa liberalisation process, 
or the dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade mediated by the EU. 
The dialogue itself is hailed internally (EULEX) as successful while 
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being measured against European values.12 The manner the values of 
dialogue appear in both EULEX’s discourse and at the EU in Brussels, 
gives the impression that more than being appreciated for its intrinsic 
political and practical significance, the dialogue is important because it 
carries a European value, and as such brings the region close to where 
the “hub of values” is situated. Furthermore, terms such as “the EU,” 
“EULEX,” and “European” are used interchangeably—as being in full 
congruence with one another. A note of protest addressed in EULEX’s 
discourse for the ‘barricades in Kosovo’s north’ seems to be an equal 
concern for “EU’s” and/or “European” interests, thus giving the impres-
sion that not only there is an indisputable line of coherence and ac-
tion between EULEX – the EU – and some broader European agenda. 
Consider the following as an example: ‘[…] grenades were thrown at 
EULEX police officers and at the […] direction of police officers from 
the European Union and […] these actions keep the region away from 
European values.13
Back to Vertical Inconsistency 
Problems of vertical coherence may occur when the foreign and secu-
rity policies of individual member states do not fit together with pol-
icies decided at the EU-level. Before delving into the explanation of 
the discourse, it is important to understand the ontological (if I may) 
problems of EULEX in Kosovo, from where its’ vertical incoherence 
derives. While initially planned as an EU rule of law mission whose 
mandate is derived from the ESDP, arrangements with EULEX’s de-
ployment changed at the last minute. With Kosovo’s authorities de-
claring a unilateral declaration of independence on 17 February 2008, 
tensions rose within the EU as Greece, Cyprus, Spain, Romania and 
Slovakia announced that they would not accept Kosovo’s independ-
ence without a new UNSC Resolution. As Papdimitrou explains, with-
out a new UN Resolution, the launch of EULEX faced huge challenges 
in terms of its precise legal status and policy objectives and noted that 
the ‘key question in this regard was whether EULEX would fall under 
the UN Resolution 1244 (which preserved Serbia’s territorial integrity) 
and as such, could not be seen to serve the objectives of the Ahtisaari’s 
Plan – the blueprint of Kosovo’s declaration of independence.’14
Due to such internal EU opposition, EULEX climbed under a Unit-
ed Nations’ umbrella and adopted “status neutral.” This formula was a 
compromise that would, first, equally appease all member states and 
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assure their support for EU’s greatest ESDP mission to date; second 
so that no reference would be made towards Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence to prevent to questioning by Serbia and Kosovo’s Serbs 
of EULEX’s legitimacy; and finally EULEX positioned itself to neither 
be in favour of, or opposition to, the declaration of independence with 
the Albanian majority. In this way, EULEX “downgraded” its self-as-
cribed presence from an activist position supported by the Ahtisaari 
Plan (for supervised independence) to a technical mission on the rule 
of law as “status neutral.”15
According to Papadimitrou, this altered mandate produced mixed 
results on the EU’s actorness in Kosovo. Apart from setting EULEX in 
a defensive “mode” – where in each circumstance it has to identify its 
neutral position – later it will be shown that most of its work and en-
ergy is spent in maintaining a “status neutral” discourse and the am-
ortisation of questions on who the mission really responds to. In their 
critical discourse analysis of EULEX, the Kosovo Centre for Security 
Studies (KSCC), argues that due to the diversity of audience, ‘double 
standards’ are applied by EULEX which is apparent in their discourse 
which deploys dual denominations (e.g. Prishtinë/Pristina, Border/
Boundary), and even addressing Kosovo institutions according to the 
UNMIK designation (e.g. PISG); or, in some cases using the full state 
designations (e.g. Ministry of Justice).16 
Peters (rightly) argues that the EU’s communication for EULEX 
retained three relatively distinct target groups: 1. the EU’s publics, 2. 
Kosovar Albanians and, 3. the Serbian community in Kosovo and Ser-
bia itself. The strategies of communication towards these three groups 
vary considerably, as their attitudes towards the deployment of EU-
LEX are fundamentally different.17 This work discuss, below, how these 
double/triple standards of communication undermine the legitimacy 
of the mission. Being the most extensive greatest ESDP mission to 
date, and carrying tremendous responsibility for maintaining or pro-
jecting the EU’s credibility, EULEX carefully crafts and articulates its 
discourse towards different publics and audiences. It’s Press and Infor-
mation Office is one of the largest departments in its headquarters in 
Pristina. 
First, it is interesting to see to what extent, and in what way, the EU’s 
discourse is directed to its own publics. Missions like these require the 
moral, political, financial support and legitimacy from the EU mem-
bers. In this respect, the inflationary discourse of EULEX promoting 
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European values, democratic standards and libertarian freedoms to 
Kosovo (as an entity which is not endowed with the former) seems 
more of discourse for the EU’s domestic political consumption. In its 
programme reports, annual and quarterly reports, EULEX mentions 
that Kosovo is plagued by corruption, inefficient rule of law systems 
and other problems, such as with organised criminal elements. Saus-
sure, for instance, whose ideas have influenced a number of post-pos-
itivist discourse theories, argues that languages are systems of dif-
ferences. He notes that ‘(n)o word has a meaning in itself, but rather 
acquires its meaning in relation to and especially in distinction from 
other words.’18 This means (he adds) that when I assert that something 
is red, I am at the same time implicitly asserting that it is not blue, 
green, white (etc). Therefore, by asserting that ‘[Kosovo] is plagued 
by corruption and organised crime,’ by implication it is asserted that 
it is not “democratic” or efficiently governed according to the rule of 
law. Derrida argues that ‘Western imperialism is deeply related to its 
philosophical thought, which is traditionally based on the ideology of 
binary opposites such as man vs. woman, spirit vs. matter and nature 
vs. culture.’19 At the same time, Kagan argues that the transmission of 
the “European miracle,” vis-à-vis the rest of the world, has become Eu-
rope’s new mission civilisatrice. Europeans have a new mission borne of 
their own discovery of perpetual peace, which is based on the Western 
European principles of modernity – democracy, the rule of law and 
human rights – and ultimately draped as the EU integration miracle 
for the Western Balkans.20 Following the fall of communism in Eastern 
Europe and the successive wars during the dissolution of Yugoslavia, 
Europe (used interchangeably with the European Union) has emerged 
as the paramount project for the successive states to emerge in the 20th 
century in the wider region (re: Central and Eastern Europe). 
Another critique, by Randazzo’s, suggests that a mission’s discourse 
of sovereignty as responsibility is loaded with references to the locals’ 
inability to self-rule as justification for an extensive presence and, basi-
cally, external control.21 This type of paternalistic responsibility, is not 
borne from the recognition of having, in certain cases, exacerbated 
existing conflicts with past colonial endeavours (re: Rwanda, Somalia, 
etc), but rather from a more arrogant position of authority which dis-
misses the locals’ self-governing abilities as “insufficient” and “prob-
lematic.” The actual practice of intervention has been characterised 
by the establishment of norms such as human rights, minority rights 
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and international order and prosperity.22 The reinforcement of such 
norms serve the purpose of acting as mere justification for the persis-
tent international presence in, ostensibly, independent states, such as 
Kosovo.23
Inconsistencies Within
In studies of the ESDP, EU external relations and, to some extent, EU 
enlargement, there’s a constant trajectory of seeking “coherence” for 
the EU. Especially in EU external relations, coherence has become 
the problem and the solution of a myriad political, policy and identity 
problems. There is an implicit/explicit inference that coherence trans-
lates into effectiveness. Derrida would say there has been a fetishisa-
tion of coherence in evaluating and assessing the EU’s performance. 
On one hand, EULEX and the EU may be regarded as trying to reach 
horizontal and vertical coherence; the impression is as though EULEX 
and the EU are in full compliance with one another and, additional-
ly, even policy areas not necessarily related to one another (education, 
security and human rights policies) are uniformly shared by EULEX 
and the EU. On the other hand, EULEX is inconsistent with its own 
coherence in Kosovo while maintaining different communication with 
different stakeholders. 
When discussing the Kosovo Albanian Public, Peters suggests it is 
the most pronounced communicative challenge for EULEX due to the 
high expectations that the Kosovar Albanian public holds both for the 
mission and the EU more generally. Kosovo’s elite and public discourse 
articulated in the media (media monitoring) is critical for what they 
call EUELX’s inefficiency to deal with the problems they have been 
invited to solve.24 Sentiment within the Kosovo Albanian community 
lodges in the idea that EULEX will manage to tackle Kosovo’s chron-
ic problems (i.e. Northern ethno-nationalist issues and high levels of 
corruption), meanwhile EULEX seeks to amortise these expectations; 
reasserting that it’s mandate is technical rather than political. Peters 
observed that the main slogan on EULEX’s website is ‘supporting local 
ownership’ in order to underline that the Kosovo government bears 
the main responsibility for the country.25 To date, EULEX has not man-
aged to deploy to Kosovo’s northern parts, which are inhabited by eth-
nic Serbs. Since the end of the conflict in 1999, Kosovo’s authorities 
have not been able to extend national jurisdiction there either. 
Yet, the problem is related to the politics of statehood and identity 
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rather than simply a problem which can be downgraded to locals’ ex-
pectations on the mission, per se. Due to it’s still unfinished status in 
terms of the Westphalian principles of sovereignty, elements pertain-
ing to statehood can easily become a butterfly effect for the Kosovo 
Albanian target group. This target group is more challenging for EU-
LEX precisely because the former has to be excruciatingly vigilant that 
its discourse retains “status neutral” of the mission and yet does not 
jeopardise the “conceptual independent” or “almost fully independent” 
Kosovo. For instance, regarding the political unsettled disputes, EU-
LEX takes into account the current border issues of Kosovo vis-à-vis its 
neighbours, and they use both terms “Border” and “Boundary” simul-
taneously as to include both perspectives, that of Kosovo (striving for 
territorial sovereignty and insisting on the usage of the term border) 
and Serbia (which does not consider to be bordering Kosovo, insisting 
on the terminology of boundary).26 In a similar fashion, EULEX refers 
to the International Border Management (IBM) concept which explic-
itly uses Integrated Border Management. However, EULEX has also 
coined a new profile of Kosovo Police Officers – namely the Kosovo 
Border Boundary Police (KBBP) which, according to the structure of 
KP 16 and the Law on Police, is a designation or structure that does 
not exist.27
Regarding EULEX communication towards Kosovo Serbs and Ser-
bia, the mission sets forward the discourse that while being a Kosovo 
mission would not eventually result in side-lining them from their fu-
ture in Kosovo. In addition, EULEX works to earn Serb trust that the 
mission is in their interests by repeatedly stating that ‘EULEX works 
to bring law and order for all people of Kosovo,’ that EULEX ‘promotes 
a multi-ethnic Kosovo.’ Most programmes, which tend to be technical 
in nature, are metamorphosed into its discourse for having an “added 
value” (another widely used, yet unclear term) the multi-ethnic charac-
ter of Kosovo and are usually read through an ethno-political lens. This 
ends up producing different effects for the target groups, particularly 
for those who live in Kosovo. Chandler argues that the EU’s promo-
tion of good governance has done little to promote democratic politi-
cal processes both in Kosovo and Bosnia and, as such, the populations 
there are seen as the ‘bearers of human rights – rather than as “citizens” 
with rights of political equality.’28 For instance, projects focused on the 
returnees from the previous conflict rather than promoted for their 
intrinsic value that the right to return to you own land as a guaranteed 
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human right, are hailed as another standard of a multi-ethnic Kosovo; 
putting minorities or communities at the epicentre. 
Another example is the process of decentralisation which, rather 
than being promoted as a process of bringing governance closer to 
citizens by dispersing the decision making mechanisms, the discourse 
has hailed it because it would ‘empower local ethnic communities’ to 
have their own small centres of governance, and that eventually adds 
further to the creation of a multi-ethnic Kosovo. Over 92% of Koso-
vo’s population are ethnically Albanian, 4% are Serbian and the rest a 
mixture of Roma, Turks, Gorani and Croats.29 In relation to the EU’s 
legitimacy in Kosovo, this downgrading of human rights into minority 
rights – which is often translated into the rights of Serbs – has gener-
ated counter-currents among (mainly) the Albanian population. First, 
the inflationary discourse to factorise the idea of multi-ethnicity in 
a rather homogenous demographic state, for the Albanian majority, 
turns it into a politically motivated agenda. For this reason, decen-
tralisation was singled out as being among the most misunderstood 
processes by Kosovo’s public precisely because the EU identified it as a 
project to give rights to minorities and empower Kosovo’s multi-eth-
nic figure rather than as an efficient mechanism of governance that is 
beneficial to all the citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origin. Second, 
while most of this discourse – as well as projects – are related to the 
Kosovo Serbs due to the conflict paradigm, other minorities have been 
marginalised. 
When it comes to EULEX’s communication to Serbia, and to a lesser 
extent to Kosovo Serbs, Buzan and Waever’s Regional Security Com-
plex Theory (RSCT) offers some explanation. The former is a novel 
approach for analysing how EULEX, as an EU mechanism within a 
state, can affect or play a role in the security dynamics within a secu-
rity region.  RSCT has the ability to expand and incorporate non-tra-
ditional discourses into the structural debate. Theoretically, it deals 
with regional security in an inclusive approach that involves a number 
of international relations theories such as constructivism and neoreal-
ism. Buzan employs constructivism in the sense that certain security 
situation is not taken for granted but where each factor is thorough-
ly analysed while maintaining a neorealist approach in its anarchic 
views. RSCT maintains that ‘most threats travel more easily over short 
distances than over long ones,’ therefore security interdependence is 
normally patterned into regionally based clusters.30 According to Bu-
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zan and Wæver, penetration occurs when a state outside a RSC asso-
ciates with a state inside the RSC, in this RSC’s are linked together, 
but remain exclusive. In this analysis, EULEX represents an external 
actor penetrating a state (Kosovo) and dictating, or contributing to, 
the security dynamics of the region. Buzan and Waever argue that for 
the Balkan development, external actors were crucial. They claim that 
‘power differentials in combination with geography allow external ac-
tors to shape the developments in the area. This defines the Balkans as 
potentially a part of the EU-Europe RSC.’
As indicated, in the northern part of Kosovo EULEX has not de-
ployed as a result of its ambivalent mandate and the general inco-
herence of the EFSP. This failure may be attributed to the UN’s mis-
management under UNMIK.  Nevertheless, the situation in northern 
Kosovo remains a cause for security concern unless the existing paral-
lel structures are dismantled and rule of law institutions begin to func-
tion under the mentoring and support of EULEX, as in other parts of 
Kosovo. The role of EULEX, therefore, is crucial in the northern part 
of Kosovo in order to eliminate organised criminality, political and le-
gal vacuums and establish a functioning rule of law institution. Any 
other scenario, such as partitioning this part of Kosovo – which could 
provoke the redefinition of borders given the ethnic composition of 
neighbouring states – would produce tremendous consequences for 
the security dynamics of the region. According to RSC theory, secu-
rity interdependence is more intense among the states inside a cer-
tain RSC than with states outside of it. Buzan claims that security is 
a ‘relational phenomenon;’ in order to understand national security 
properly, the surrounding pattern of security interdependence should 
be understood in the first place.31 Two important factors are the en-
mity and amity among units. These include established relationships 
between states (over time and relating to certain issues), ranging from 
resolving border disputes, to political ideology and the establishment 
of long-term historical bonds (in this contextual political and historic 
realm, analysis on the relations between Kosovo and Serbia, Kosovo 
and Albania and Kosovo and Macedonia).32
The European perspective offers both a strategic objective and an 
incentive for transformation and is motivated by EU considerations 
of regional and international stabilisation. There are a number of op-
portunities derived from the EULEX mission: it supports Kosovo on 
its path to greater European integration in the rule of law area, it sup-
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ports the visa liberalisation process, it supports the Pristina-Belgrade 
dialogue (facilitated by Brussels), it continues to concentrate on the 
fight against corruption and works closely with its local counterparts 
to achieve sustainability and EU best practices in Kosovo. EULEX pri-
oritises the establishment of the rule of law in the north. By this to-
ken, the successful implementation of the mandate of EULEX, as a key 
mechanism of EU, can affect positive changes in the security dynamics 
of the region.
Instead of a Conclusion 
Notwithstanding its legal and political constraints, EULEX’s presence 
in Kosovo is defined by inaction and avoidance. Selecting to remain 
neutral in an otherwise politically and ethnically tense environment, 
EULEX is, most of the time, situated not to act or take sides but rather 
to stick to its job description—that is working on enhancing the rule 
of law. In relation to this, Zaki Laïdi argues that power ‘is conceived 
and experienced less and less as a process of taking over responsibili-
ties, and more as a game of avoidance.’33 This is also the basis of Chan-
dler’s criticism as he notes that all state-building efforts of today are 
characterised by a lack of a clear political goal or vision, which leads to 
the rejection of the responsibilities that the use of power would nor-
mally entail.34 However, stretching to reach the high expectations of 
Kosovo Albanians, EULEX works closely with what are established as 
Republics’ of Kosovo institutions (government, Customs, Ministry of 
Justice) coping, this way, with the Kosovo Albanian’s “satisfaction” (i.e. 
legitimacy). On the other hand, the politicising of technical and polit-
ical policies into the realms of ethnic minority rights and the mainte-
nance of a multi-ethnic society, EULEX keeps its neutrality and seeks 
legitimacy from Kosovo Serbs as well. While it will be presumptuous 
to conclude that EULEX’s unitary communication with all its relevant 
publics would ultimately make the mission more effective, at this stage 
of the mission, giving single, unambiguous and unequivocal messages 
could be a stepping stone to increase its legitimacy.
***
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